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I. INTRODUCTION

A patent assertion entity (PAE) is a company that is organized for
the sole purpose of acquiring and enforcing patents.1 Similar to other
non-practicing entities (NPE), a PAE does not practice the claims set
forth in its patents. 2 A PAE not only does not manufacture, distribute, or
sell any products or services, it, unlike many other NPEs such as
universities and sole inventors, has no direct or indirect interest in
facilitating the sale of products or services by others. 3 Because PAEs
are not viewed as being inventive or productive, their social utility has
come into question. 4 This is especially so because of a great increase in
the number of patent suits filed by PAEs. 5 Recently, the number of
patent suits filed by PAEs has begun to exceed the number of patent
suits filed by all other entities.6 Moreover, the PAE business model
appears to be increasingly successful; a recent article estimates that
defendants and licensees paid PAEs $29 billion in 2011
for their patent
7
rights, a four-fold increase from the figure for 2005.
Given the success of the PAE business model, one may think that
PAEs are especially good in identifying, acquiring, and asserting highvalue patents. This Article argues otherwise. Based on the insight and
1. A recent White House report defined a PAE as a firm that
do[es] not practice the patents [it owns] and instead [engages] in aggressive
litigation to collect license and other fees from alleged infringers. A review of
the evidence suggests that on balance, such patent assertion entities (PAEs)
(also known as "patent trolls") have had a negative impact on innovation and
economic growth.
2 (2013),
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent-report.pdf.
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 3-4.
4. Id. at 2. However, more broadly, NPEs are recognized as having social utility because
they serve a useful patent intermediary function in facilitating the transfer of technology from
innovators to the entities that are in the best position to exploit innovations. Id. at 2-3.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id. at 4 (noting that PAEs accounted for 62% of all patent suits brought in 2012).
7. James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs From NPE Disputes 19, 24,
31 (Boston Univ. Sch. Law, Working Paper No. 12-34, 2012), available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2012.html.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION
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discussion of a 2005 article by Gideon Parchomovsky, 8 the observation
that PAEs most often assert multiple patents (that is, a portfolio of
patents) against a product or a line of products, and considerations of
probability, 9 this Article argues that PAEs are virtually assured of
victory. For that reason, their success is not a direct reflection of the
ability of PAEs to identify high-value patents.
The main contribution of this Article is articulating the mathematical
basis for the observation that a PAE that asserts a portfolio of patents
against a product or a product line is assured of success; that is, a
finding of patent liability on the part of the accused infringer in
connection with at least one asserted patent. This liability is assured
where the set of material issues in dispute for the asserted portfolio of
patents are mathematically independent and a large number of patents
are asserted. The mathematical independence of a set of material issues
means that the resolution of any one material issue does not affect the
probabilities of resolution of the others. The mathematical independence
assumption should hold where the patents selected for assertion against
areas.10
the product or line of products are from different technology
For example, this assumption likely holds when the patents asserted
against a successful tablet computer include patents directed to
processor instruction execution, processing for rendering graphics
display images, and the construction of the liquid crystal display of the
tablet computer." Each of the material legal issues that will be
contested by the parties in a patent litigation involving such patents will
likely be different, justifying the assumption of mathematically
independent probabilities for the patentee's prevailing on these issues.
Moreover, given the current state of patent litigation in the United
States, the process of determination of whether each patent is infringed
will usually involve the resolution of 5-10 material legal issues. A PAE,
8. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & K. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA.
L. REv. 1, 60-65 (2005).
9. These probability considerations are discussed in infra Part IV.
10. This is because material issues relating to a patent in one technology area should not
relate to material issues relating to a patent in another technology area. PAEs frequently assert
patents in different technology areas against a single product or product line of a hi-tech
consumer goods company. See, e.g., Certain Consumer Electronics and Display Devices and
Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-836, available at http://www.itcblog.com/wpConsumer Electronics
Certain
[hereinafter
content/uploads/2013/05/gpcomplaint.pdf
Complaint]. The case eventually settled before an ITC decision. Additionally, the material
issues in dispute in connection with a specific patent can usually be reduced to a core set of
independent material issues.
11. See, e.g., id.
12. But see Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 33 n.120 (asserting that the
assumption of absolute mathematical independence is too strong, but that the likelihood of
success of an infringement suit still increases as portfolio size increases).
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before it files suit, is usually able to identify and acquire those patents
that present the most favorable set of probabilities for the material
issues that need to be resolved for determination of patent infringement
liability. However, regardless of the exact values of these probabilities,
the PAE may, at least theoretically, assure itself of victory by asserting
a sufficiently large number of patents against the target product or
product line. In fact, this Article shows that in the limit of assertion of a
sufficiently large number of patents, the outcome is insensitive to the
exact values of probabilities of prevailing on the material legal issues.
Because of the virtual certainty of PAE victory in portfolio patent
litigation, this Article predicts that many reforms that have been
implemented or that are currently being discussed will likely have small
or negligible impact in eliminating or materially reducing the number of
PAE litigations. For example, while shifting the cost of litigation onto
the losing party may increase the perceived risk of a PAE filing a patent
suit, the fact that the PAE is assured of victory by asserting a sufficient
number of patents would likely lead it to nevertheless file the suit.
A corollary of the result that a PAE is assured of victory by asserting
a sufficient number of patents is that the value of a specific patent likely
has strong dependence on how it is asserted-for example, on whether
it is asserted by itself or in conjunction with other patents, and, if the
latter, whether the different patents are asserted against the same or
different products and product lines. Known methodologies for valuing
patents, to the extent they do not consider how the value proposition
may be impacted by assertion together with other patents, may be
deficient.
Part II of this Article reviews the generally unsatisfactory efforts up
to now in valuing patents. Part III discusses the Parchomovsky article,
which provided the insight that "the true value of patents lies not in their
individual worth, but in their aggregation into a collection of related
patents-a patent portfolio."' 3 Part IV discusses the mathematical basis
for the assertion that the patentee's probability of prevailing on at least
one asserted patent increases as the number of asserted patents in the
portfolio increases. This discussion is based on, among other things,
consideration of the number of material legal issues that are observed in
modem patent infringement litigation. However, the analysis is not
sensitive to the exact values of these probabilities. Part V applies the
ideas that are discussed in Part IV to the specific case of PAE patent
litigation. Part VI discusses results of the analysis, evaluates various
policy options directed to PAEs in the context of the findings of this
Article, and provides a few conclusions.

13. Id. at 77.
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II. THE PROBLEM OF VALUATION

OF PATENTS

The valuation of patents is an unsolved problem. 14 Much has been
written about the valuation of patents, but there is no universally
accepted, precise methodology for valuing patents. 15 This is becoming
an increasingly serious problem, because the United States and world
economies are increasingly based on a foundation of technological
property, with an ever-greater number of transactions and disputes
relating to patents arising among companies. The lack of a widely
accepted methodology to value patents likely leads to great legal
uncertainty and hinders the efficient transfer and utilization of
technology.
Companies, patent professionals, practitioners, and judges, to
complete transactions involving the transfer of technology or resolve
patent disputes, necessarily resort to various methodologies in directly
or indirectly valuing patents. 16 But often, the results of these
methodologies appear to be at least partially random, and in some cases,
measurably wrong.17
In a recent example of how even the most sophisticated patent
valuation professionals may be way off in their valuations, the patent
valuation firm M-Cam, Inc. had appraised AOL's patent portfolio at
$290 million, with most other experts valuing the portfolio as being
worth no more than $300 million. 18 Microsoft purchased the AOL
portfolio at a price that was more than $1 billion. 19 In another recent
example, Kodak, facing bankruptcy, desired to sell its patent portfolio
$2.5 billion. 20 Kodak was able to sell its
and expected a sum exceeding 21
portfolio for only $525 million.
Uncertainty regarding valuation also pervades patent infringement
damages decisions in the judicial system. For example, for
approximately fifteen years, one method of calculating reasonableroyalty compensatory damages upon a district court's finding of patent

14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 4 n.1.
16. See id. at 19-26 (discussing different theories of patent valuation).
17. See id
18. Bruce Berman, Could AOL Patent Sale Have Netted More than SIB?, IP CLOSEUP
(Apr. 10, 2012), http://ipcloseup.wordpress.com/2012/04/10/could-aol-patent-sale-have-nettedmore-than- I b/.
19. Id.
20. Andrew Martin, Kodak to Sell DigitalImaging Patentsfor $525 Million, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/business/kodak-to-sell-patents-for-525million.html.
21. These are summarized in infra Part II.A-F which also discusses the appropriateness of
applying the methodologies to value patents.
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infringement involved the so-called "25% rule." 22 This rule had been
used as a "tool [for approximating] the reasonable royalty rate that the
manufacturer of a patented product would be willing to offer to pay the
patentee during a hypothetical negotiation." 23 According to this rule,
25% of the infringer's profits from sale or use of infringing products are
designated as a baseline royalty, which can be increased or decreased
based on the Georgia-Pacific factors.2 4 The Federal Circuit in 2011
rejected the 25% rule, finding that it was a "fundamentally flawed tool
for determining a baseline royalty in a hypothetical negotiation," 25 and
also finding that evidence relating to the rule was "inadmissible under
Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence."2 6 In so 27finding, the appeals
court vacated a jury damages award of $388 million.
The damages awards for patent cases not involving the 25% rule also
28
indicate that there is great uncertainty regarding valuation of patents.
For example, most of the top ten patent infringement damages awards
of 2012 were vacated, remanded or reduced on appeal. 29 Additionally,
the difference between median awards of juries and of the bench has
increased immensely over time with the median jury award during the
period 2007-2012 being 40 times as large as the median bench award,
compared to a discrepancy of only a factor of 1.2 during the period
1995-2000. 30 In relatively recent examples that are dramatic, a $357
million jury award in litigation involving Lucent and Microsoft was
reduced to approximately $26 million, 3 1 and a $1 billion jury award in
litigation involving
Apple and Samsung was reduced to approximately
32
$599 million.

22. See, e.g., Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting
that Fonar's expert witness "testified that one-quarter to one-third of the anticipated profits on
the sale of the infringing machines would have constituted a reasonable royalty").
23.

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

24. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. set forth fifteen factors that may be
considered under the most commonly used method to determine reasonable royalty damages in
a patent case. See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), mod.and affd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
25. Uniloc USA,632 F.3d at 1315.

26. Id.
27. Id. at 1311, 1323.

28. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 8 (2013), available at
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/201 3-patent-litigation-study.jhtml
(noting that few high-value patent damages awards have been upheld).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 10.
31. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see
also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 837 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2011).
32. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1103, 1120 (N.D. Cal.
2013).
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33
Valuation uncertainty also has an impact during prosecution.
Often, a company cannot know with any degree of certainty the
commercial benefits that a particular invention, if patented, would
yield.34 Given this uncertainty, companies often decide to expend the
same share of resources on each application, despite the almost certain
knowledge that some of the inventions, when patented, will yield
commercial benefits significantly larger than the commercial benefits
yielded by other patents in the portfolio.35
Patents may be hard to value because their valuation involves more
uncertainty and complexity compared to traditional asset classes that are
more easily understood and which are often used as bases of

comparison to the patent right.36 For example, patents are sometimes

compared to stock or options on stock.3 7 Although predicting stock
prices is also fraught with difficulties, there are well-understood
methodologies for predicting the value of options on stocks. 38 In any
case, stock markets provide a market valuation for publicly traded stock
nearly continuously. There is no analogous market that provides a value
for patents at frequent time intervals.39 Furthermore, stock prices may
be estimated from the estimated total value of the relevant company,
because stock represents a predetermined percentage of ownership of
the company to which it pertains. It is not as easy to correlate the value
of one or more patents owned by a company to the company's net
worth, or even the entire value of its intellectual property portfolio.
Given that the patent right is a property right, patents may also be
33. See Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents: A Review of Patent Valuation
Methods With Consideration of Option Based Methods and the Potentialfor FurtherResearch

1, 3 (Univ. of Cambridge Judge Inst. of Mgmt. Studies, Working Paper No. 21/97, 1997)
(discussing the importance of realistic patent damages valuations to overcome judicial
allegations of overly speculative assertions).
34. See id. at 3-5; see also Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV.
341, 343 (2010) (arguing that patent law contributes to the lack of commercialization of
patents).
35. Id.
36. See WILLIAM J. MURPHY ET AL., PATENT VALUATION: IMPROVING DECISION MAKING
THROUGH ANALYSIS 8, 121-22, 127, 129 (2012).

37. F. Russel Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the
Complex Mathematics of PatentPricing,55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1194-96 (2003).

38. These methodologies are summarized in Part II of this Article, which also discusses
the appropriateness of applying the methodologies to value patents.
39. See WILLIAM J. MURPHY ET AL., PATENT VALUATION: IMPROVING DECISION MAKING
THROUGH ANALYSIS 201-02 (2012). Patent auctions have recently begun to be held from time to
time. Id. Up until now, they have not been organized regularly. Id. Furthermore, in these
auctions, patents are usually offered in groups rather than on an individual basis. Id. Although
patent auctions represent an improvement to the patent system in connection with the valuation
of patents, they are nowhere near to providing the continuous and reliable information regarding
valuation that the stock market provides in connection with the valuation of stock. Id.
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compared to real property.40 For example, the right to exclude provided
by a patent has been compared to the right of a landowner to exclude
third parties from the owned land. 4 1 However, once again, there are too
many differences for methodologies for valuation of real property to
usefully apply to valuation of patents. Similar to the situation with
stocks and options, there usually is an active market for real property
that values real property at relatively frequent time intervals. For
example, real estate agents and the listings they keep and advertise
serve such a function. 42 Additionally, publicly accessible property
records usually contain information on the sales prices of parcels of
land. An active market does not exist for patents. Another important
difference is that patents may be put to more complex uses compared to
real property. For example, a unit of real property may usually only be
rented to one person or entity at a time. However, a patent may be
licensed to more than one person at a time, and may be so licensed for
the same use or a different use. Additionally, a patent may be packaged
with other patents and property and licensed together in one or more
pools. 44 There are usually no such analogous uses of real property. The
increased complexity arising from the possibility to license to multiple
parties, finely carve out particular uses of the patented invention, and
for bundling together rights under other patents and intellectual property
likely also renders
valuation of patents more difficult than doing so for
45
property.
real
A. Methodologiesfor Valuing Patents
Despite the difficulties in valuing a patent, it is often necessary to
assign a value in commercial and legal contexts. 46 The parties to a
40. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HRv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 108, 109 (1990) (likening patent rights to real property rights).
41. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in PatentLaw, 22 HARv. J.L.
& TECH. 321, 323, 347-49 (2009) (noting the shared right to exclude in patents and property);
see also Mark A. Lemley, IgnoringPatents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 19, 23-25, 23 n.22 (2008)
(discussing the analogy between patents and real property and citing to other discussions of this
analogy).
42. See Malcolm T. Meeks & Charles A. Eldering, Patent Valuation: Aren't We
ForgettingSomething? Making the Casefor Claims Analysis in Patent Valuation by Proposing
a Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount Rate Using the CAPM, 9 Nw. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 194, 202 (2010).
43. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 36, at 201-02.

44. See Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Cross-Licensing
and Antitrust Law, Address Before the American Intellectual Property Law Association 3 n.3 (May
2, 1997), availableat http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/ 11 18.pdf.
45. That is, there are a greater number of states or possibilities to consider in transactions
involving a patent compared to a piece of real property.
46. See Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents: A Review of Patent Valuation
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licensing or assignment transaction must effectively do so when
agreeing to an applicable royalty for the license or a sale price for the
assignment. 47 A judge must also do so when determining damages in a
patent infringement suit, as discussed in Part II of this Article.
B. DiscountedCash Flow andIncome-Based Methods
In cases in which it is possible to estimate future cash flows that
arise from the patent, it may be possible to calculate the net present
4
value of such cash flows as the estimate of the patent's value. Doing
so requires discounting the cash flows by the risk-free interest rate to
account for the time value of money, and possibly by other factors to
account for uncertainty regarding whether the projected cash flows will
actually materialize.49
It is not possible, in many cases, to estimate the future cash flow that a
patent will provide, especially if the patent is new or has not yet been
exploited. 50 For that reason, use of the discounted cash flow, or DCF,
method is generally limited to very specific circumstances. Even in cases
in which future cash flows may be estimated with some accuracy, the
as
DCF method may fail to provide for non-cash flow related value, such
51
competitors.
against
provides
patent
a
value
deterrent
the defensive,
C. Market-Based Methods
In a market-based valuation, a patent is valued based on the known
or well-estimated value of another comparable patent. 52 Such a method
may be sufficiently accurate where the comparable patent was acquired
or sold in a transaction comparable to the one involving the patent that
is being valued. 53 However, if the comparable patent and the patent to
be valued are to be used differently in the respective post-transaction
periods , then the market-based method may not provide an accurate
value.
Methods With Considerationof Option Based Methods and the Potentialfor FurtherResearch I

(Univ. of Cambridge Judge Inst. of Mgmt. Studies, Working Paper No. 21/97, 1997).
47. Id. at 3.
48. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 36, at 121-31 (providing examples and calculations

for discounted cash flow analyses as applied to patents).
49. Id.
50. See Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents: A Review of Patent Valuation
Methods With Considerationof Option Based Methods and the Potentialfor FurtherResearch

1, 8-9 (Univ. of Cambridge Judge Inst. of Mgmt. Studies, Working Paper No. 21/97, 1997).
51. Seeid. at9.
52. See id. at 7.

53 See id. at 8-9.
54.

See Liina Tonisson & Dr. Lutz Maicher, Patents, Their Importance and Valuation
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One subclass of market-based methods for valuation involves
calculation of the residual value after deducting all other known asset
55
values from the market value of a company whose value is known.
However, the residual value will often correspond to the total value of a
large number of intangible assets so that the value of a specific
intangible asset from among that set is not easily obtainable.56
D. Cost-Based Methods
In perhaps the methodology that yields the least accurate and least
precise valuations, one can estimate a value for a patent based on the
historical cost of obtaining the patent, or the current cost of trying to
obtain a similar patent.57 Such methods do not account for or value the
future benefits the patent may provide, and, for that reason, do not
usually provide useful valuations.58 Such methods are frequently used,
however, in historical cost-based accounting systems or for purposes of
calculating taxes.59
E. Indicator-BasedMethods
Indicator-based methods can determine the relative value of a patent
in comparison to a set of other patents. A relative value that is so
determined may then be used to adjust a valuation that is determined in
accordance with one of the other methodologies to yield a better
estimate of the value of the patent.
One early example of such an indicator-based method references
renewal data. The decision to pay a renewal fee to maintain a patent in
force indicates a judgment on the part of the patent holder that the value
of the patent is in excess of the renewal fee. 60 Thus, tracking renewal
data for a patent provides information regarding the value of the patent.
More recently developed examples include using one or more of the
number of forward citations in other patents of the patent being valued,
the number of backward citations in the patent being valued to other
Methods 10 (Fraunhofer MOEZ Working Paper, Issue No. 3/2012, 2012), available at
http://www.moez.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/moez/de/documents/WorkingPaper/WP2012%

20Nr. IPatent-Valua tion_final.pdf.
55. See Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents: A Review of Patent Valuation
Methods With Considerationof Option Based Methods and the Potentialfor FurtherResearch

1, 7 (Univ. of Cambridge Judge Inst. of Mgmt. Studies, Working Paper No. 21/97, 1997) (citing
Russell L. Parr, FairRates of Return, PATENT WORLD 36-41 (July 1988)).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. at 7.
See id. at 6.
Id. at 16.
See id. at 6.
Seeid. at 17-18.
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patents and the age of those patents, market value of the company that
owns the patent being valued, and the number of oppositions
6' or other
patent.
the
with
connection
in
filed
proceedings
post-issuance
F. Option-BasedMethods
There have been attempts to value patents based on the theory of
valuation of financial options. Financial options, such as call or put
options on shares in a company may be valued based on the so-called
Black-Scholes analysis. 62 In the simplest form of the analysis involving
the value of a European call option, share prices are assumed to follow a
lognormal random walk, the risk-free interest rate and the volatility of
the shares are considered to be constant, the shares are assumed to pay
no dividends, there are no transaction costs, there are no arbitrage
possibilities, trading of the shares takes place continuously, short selling
is permissible, and the shares are divisible. 63 Under such conditions, a
deterministic (non-stochastic) partial differential equation for the option
value can be obtained and solved.6 4 The solution expresses the option
value as a function of current asset price and time, with the exercise
price, risk-free interest rate and the volatility of the shares set forth as
constant parameters. 65 In the standard derivation of the solution, a
crucial step involves construction of a portfolio that includes the call
option and a number of shares in a way that eliminates a stochastic
factor that is present in the equation due to the assumption that the share
prices follow a lognormal random walk.66 Once randomness is
eliminated from the equation in this way, the return on the portfolio is
equated to the return of a riskless asset based on the no-arbitrage
assumption, and the equation is solved.6 7 There are also binomial
models for valuing a financial option68that lead to equivalent solutions
based on assumptions of no arbitrage.
Pitkethly discusses the application of such methods for valuing
financial options to real (that is, non-financial) options.6 9 Pitkethly
points out that, unlike the situation in the financial options case, there
61. See Tonisson, supra note 54, at 20-21.
62. See PAUL WILMOTr ET AL., THE MATHEMATICS OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 43 (1995).
63. Seeid. at41-42, 48.
64. Id. at 78-80.
65. Id. at 79.
66. Id. at 42-43.
67. Id. at 42-43, 76-80.
68. See John C. Cox et al., Option Pricing: A Simplified Approach, 7 J. FIN. EcoN. 229,
232-41,246-54 (1979).
69. See Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents: A Review of Patent Valuation
Methods With Consideration of Option Based Methods and the Potentialfor FurtherResearch

1, 10-21 (Univ. of Cambridge Judge Inst. of Mgmt. Studies, Working Paper No. 21/97, 1997).
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may not be a no-arbitrage equilibrium with a "spanning" portfolio of
assets in the case of valuation of a patent, which might otherwise render
the Black-Scholes analysis valid for valuing patents. 70 Additionally,
Pitkethly indicates that the assumption of constant volatility of the
underlying asset (that is, for call options, the volatility of the price of the
corresponding share) may not be accurate in the context of patent
valuation. 71 Further, Pitkethly points out that real options consist of
multiple or compound options in a chain with numerous
interdependencies. 72 Despite these difficulties and the complex nature of
the problem, Pitkethly
73 concludes that option-based valuation of patents
possible.
be
should
The literature includes attempts to use option theory to value patents
in various contexts.74 None of these appears to be fully satisfactory in
providing an accurate value that would be accepted by all reasonable
practitioners.75
70. See id. at 14-15. The spanning portfolio of assets, in the case of financial options as
discussed earlier, comprises a portfolio that includes the option and the underlying shares in a
proportion that is chosen to eliminate randomness due to the lognormal random walk of the
share's price. In the financial options case, this leads to a deterministic partial differential
equation for the value of the option. See id.
71. See id.at 15-16.
72. For example, the post-grant phase of a patent may be treated as a series of options on
the next years' benefits. Thus, patent value is considered in the context of a chain of multiple
options. Id. at 19. Similarly, valuation of a patent application may be based on considering the
consecutively arising options relating to paying the initial cost of the original application, the
initial cost of foreign applications and the costs of preliminary examination and search, the cost
of filing follow-on or continuation applications, and the cost of the grant fee. Id. at 20, 30.
73. Id. at 23-24.
74. See, e.g., Denton, supra note 37, at 1179-80; see generally Alan C. Marco, The
Option Value of Patent Litigation: Theory and Evidence, 14 REV. FIN. EcON. 323 (2005)
(discussing a real options approach to patent litigation).
75. In Black-Scholes formalism, the value of the option is calculated as a function of the
value of the present value of an underlying asset (i.e., the stock). See F. Russel Denton & Paul J.
Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics of Patent
Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1194-95 (2003). The Denton article, in one section, argues
that a patent is analogous to a stock option (and hence is not analogous to the underlying asset,
which is the share). Id. However, in applying Black-Scholes formalism, the Denton article
appears to treat the patent as the underlying asset, and the license of the patent as the option. Id.
at 1203-19 (solving the Black-Scholes equation for C, the value of the option, which, in the
Denton article's treatment, appears to be the price of a license to the patent). Further, the Denton
article does not appear to justify in the patent context the no-arbitrage assumption for financial
options, on which the Black-Scholes equation is based. See supra notes 62-69 for a discussion
on the Black-Scholes equation and its derivation. The Marco article formulates and solves a
mathematical model in which profit generated by the patent is assumed to follow geometric
Brownian motion. See Alan C. Marco, The Option Value of Patent Litigation: Theory and
Evidence, 14 REV. FIN. EcON. 323, 325 (2005). The model further assumes a terminal payoff
value n that the patentee receives if the patentee asserts the patent in litigation, and that is
discounted by the probability that the patent is invalid. Id. If, at any time, the present value of
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III. THE PARCHOMOVSKY ARTICLE AND THE PORTFOLIO THEORY OF
PATENT VALUATION

The Parchomovsky article notes that none of the known
methodologies for valuing patents are satisfactor, and proposes an
entirely different way of looking at the problem. In particular, the
Parchomovsky article proposes that "[t]he true value of patents inheres
not in their individual worth, but in their aggregation into a collection of
related patents-a patent portfolio. ' 77 By focusing on the portfolio, the
Parchomovsky article was able to explain 78a number of trends in the
patent system, including the patent paradox.
A. PatentParadox
The patent paradox is based on the observation that empirical
research indicates that industry participants do not consider patents to
be an effective protection mechanism, and that empirical studies suggest
that the average value of a patent is quite small. 79 For example, one
empirical work estimated that the mean patent value is around $4,000
for pharmaceutical patents, $5,000 for chemical patents, $15,000 for
8 ° The
mechanical patents and $20,000 for electronics patents.
Parchomovsky article points out that, nevertheless, the number of patent
to
application filings in the United States and the world continues
81
important.
are
patents
though
as
act
increase, and that companies
B. PreviousAttempts to Resolve the PatentParadox
Previous attempts to resolve the paradox do not seem to be
satisfactory. For example, an explanation that patentees irrationally
acquire patents despite their low value is likely not correct, given that
the companies that participate in the most extensive patenting activity

the patent drops below the terminal payoff value n, litigation is assumed to ensue. Id. at 32526. This model leads to a stochastic differential equation that may be solved for the value of the
patent. Id. at 327-29. The model is rigorous; however, the assumption that the value of the
patent is zero, once asserted and once the terminal payoff is extracted appears to be unrealistic
given that patents may be litigated multiple times, or licensed to non-litigants after assertion in
litigation. Id.It is also not clear why profits derived from patents should follow geometric
Brownian motion.
76. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 4-5.
77. Id. at 5-6.
78. See generally id.
79. Id. at 14.
80. Id.at 16-17 (citing Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection?
Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77 (1998)).
81. Id. at 17-18.
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are those that operate in the most competitive industries. 82 Needlessly
wasting resources on a large scale on worthless patents would be
expected to place such companies at a competitive
disadvantage.
83
seen.
is
disadvantage
competitive
such
no
However,
In accordance with another theory, patents serve as a signaling
device that the patentee is a high quality company, given the expense of
obtaining patents. 84 Low quality companies would be unable to mimic
such signals, given the expense of obtaining patents. Through such
signals, the market is made to perceive value in the companies engaged
in patenting. However, this rationale does not resolve the patent
paradox, because it is not clear why the market would care about a
company obtaining a commodity that does not have much intrinsic
value. 85 In other words, obtaining and signaling the acquisition of
patents should not act as a signal that the patenting
company is valuable,
86
given that patents on average are not valuable.
According to another theory, the acquisition of patents serves the
intra-company purpose of indicating to the company management that
employees are doing their jobs. 87 Given that it is virtually impossible to
directly measure employee effort, patents may be a useful quantifiable
metric that the employees are performing. However, this rationale also
does not resolve the patent paradox. If patents really are low value, as
the evidence suggests, then equating patent application filings with
successful job performance appears to be incorrect. 88 In fact, given the
costs of patenting, employees who engage in patenting may be wasting
valuable resources and should
be directed to channel their energy for
89
other company purposes.
According to the lottery theory, patents are lottery tickets in that
although most have negligible value, a few are so valuable that they
provide a sufficient incentive for companies to undertake patenting
activity. 9° The Parchomovsky article discusses a few different rationale
for why that might not be the case, including the fact that most investors
are risk averse and would not normally invest in activity that has a
82. Id. at 19.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 20-22 (citing and discussing Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. COn. L. REV.
625 (2002)).

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 22-24 (citing and discussing Richard C. Levin, A New Look at the Patent
System, 76 AM. ECON. REV. (1986)).

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 24-26 (citing and discussing F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001)).
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negative expected value (unlike the typical lottery player). 91
The Parchomovsky article also considers defensive patenting as an
alternative theory for resolving the patent paradox. According to this
theory, companies obtain patents to deter potential patent infringement
suits. This theory provides considerable explanatory power; however, it
only focuses on the defensive use of patents and fails to provide any
92
rationale for obtaining a patent from an offensive perspective. In
particular, it does not provide any explanation of patent value other than
the potential avoided costs patents might provide.
C. PatentPortfoliosand TheirBenefits to Their Holders
The Parchomovsky article divides the benefits of patent portfolios to
their holders into two general classes: scale-related benefits and
diversity-related benefits. 9 Perhaps most importantly as a scale-related
benefit, a patent portfolio, especially when the various patent members
are closely related, operates as a "super-patent" that excludes third
parties from the collective scope of their claims. 94 The Parchomovsky
article discusses other scale-related benefits, such as allowing a
company to freely proceed along an innovation path in the cumulative
technology area of the patent portfolio with less concern about
infringing the patent rights of third parties; attracting innovations
external to the company to the company through an easier process of
licensing and acquisition; avoiding costly litigation because of the
enhanced deterrence properties of a portfolio of patents compared to a
single patent; improving bargaining position of the portfolio holder
compared to competitors in the relevant market segment; attracting and
ensuring the company's voice is heard in relevant
retaining capital; and 95
debates.
policy
patent
The Parchomovsky article in particular points out that the litigation
avoidance effect provided by a portfolio of patents relates to the fact
that the win probability of the holder will increase with the increase in
the portfolio size. 96 For example, assuming an average loss probability
of 75% per asserted patent, a portfolio of just three patents would bring
97
the likelihood of success of the portfolio holder above 50%.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 25-26.
Id.
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 33-37.
Idat 35 n. 120.
This observation is a fundamental insight that motivates this Article. The

Parchomovsky article considers this point in connection with the deterrence value of patents, but
does not consider the calculus of probabilities of winning on the level of a discrete set of issues
per patent in a litigation involving a portfolio of patents, and does not consider the impact of the
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Regarding the diversity-related benefits of a portfolio of patents, the
Parchomovsky article points out that the patents in a portfolio are not
identical, and that the distribution of importance across the different
patents that comprise the portfolio provides hedging against the risk and
uncertainty that are bound together with innovation in the modem
economy. 98 Specific diversity-related benefits include addressing ex
ante uncertainty regarding whether specific technological features of a
specific patent will turn out to be valuable; 99 expanding the freedom of
research inquiry into a broader set of areas compared to that offered by
a single patent; and addressing uncertainties 00related to future market
conditions, future competitors and patent law.1
D. Resolution of the PatentParadox
The Parchomovsky article's portfolio theory explains and resolves
the patent paradox in an apparent way. Companies engage in patenting
activity with great expenditure of resources, despite the low expected
value of specific patents, because in so doing they effectively purchase
the advantages of aggregation of the individual patents within the patent
portfolio.' 0 Companies acquiring patents and increasing the size of
their portfolios are therefore being entirely rational, because in most
cases, the marginal expected value of expanding the portfolio by one
patent exceeds the marginal cost of obtaining that additional patent.
E. Predictionsof the Portfolio Theory
The Parchomovsky article, based on the portfolio theory of
valuation, predicted that patent intensity will remain high, pressure on
the PTO to increase patent quality will increase, patent thickets will
continue to grow, patent litigation will become more complex and
costly, mass licensing arrangements will proliferate, the patent system
will increasingly favor large, well-funded, incumbent players, and the
asymmetry in patent litigations undertaken by patent assertion entities. See discussion infra Part

IV.
98. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 37-38.
99. See id.
at 38. In particular, a portfolio of patents allows the patentee to address ex ante
uncertainty about the features of a product that that will ultimately be successful. Id.For
example, if many patent applications are filed directed to different features of a particular
product, the patentee may be able to later in the process (i.e., after filing an initial set of patents)
file follow-on continuation applications to obtain comprehensive coverage of the features that
are successful. Similarly, the patentee may be able to abandon the patents covering features of
the product that are not successful.
100. Id.at38-41.
101. Idat 52.
102. Id.at 42.
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patents will become more obscure and increasingly
value of individual
03
irrelevant. 1
Approximately 8 years after publication of the Parchomovsky
article, many of these predictions are substantiated. For example, the
total number of patent suits commenced has increased from around
3000 in 2005 to more than approximately 5000 in 2012.104 Similarly,
the number of patents granted has increased from around 170,000 to
approximately 270,000 in 2012.' ° Although there appear to be no
easily available, definitive statistics, patent litigation costs also appear
to be escalating. 10 6 The quality of patents and the uncertainty of rights
arising from low quality patents continue to be an issue.' 0 7 Additionally,
patent thickets are an increasingly articulated problem, and not just in
the United States.' 0 8 Most of the evidence available indicates that the

predictions of the Parchomovsky article have been realized, and that
they will continue to be relevant going forward.
IV. THE VIRTUAL CERTAINTY OF WINNING PORTFOLIO
PATENT LITIGATION

The fundamental insight of the Parchomovsky article that motivates
this Article is that the win probability in litigation of a holder of a
portfolio of patents will increase with the increase in the portfolio
size. 109 This Article considers this aspect in more detail below, and
attempts to provide a more rigorous underlying quantitative basis.
Furthermore, this Article posits that this principle, in combination with
103. Id at 60-66.
104. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 28, fig. 1. See also EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 5 (providing statistics on the total number of patent cases filed
and the percentage filed by PAEs).
105. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 28, fig.1.
106. See Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
219, 226-29 (2011); PRICEWATERitOUSECOOPERS, supra note 28, at 25. See also U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REPORT TO CONG. COMMS., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; ASSESSING
FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT
QUALITY 25-26 (2011); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 9.
107. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 106, at 28-32, 39-45; EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 3.
108. See, e.g., U.K. INTELL. PROP. OFF., A STUDY OF PATENT THICKETS (2013), available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-thickets.pdf.
109. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 35 n.120. However, as discussed
earlier, the Parchomovsky & Wagner article only considers this aspect in connection with the
deterrence value of patents, and does not consider the calculus of probabilities of winning on the
level of a discrete set of issues per patent in a litigation involving a portfolio of patents, and does
not consider the impact of these result to the asymmetries of patent litigation undertaken by a
PAE. See supra note 97.
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the way the patent system currently works, virtually assures that PAEs
will be successful in asserting a portfolio of patents against a targeted
product or product line. A corollary of this is that a patent system in
which an unlimited number of patents can be asserted against a single
targeted product or product line will almost always result in patent
liability. This result is tempered somewhat in the context of large-scale
portfolio litigations of patentees against one another, because the end
result usually approaches a stalemate that leads to, for example, a crosslicensing agreement. There is no such temperance in the context of PAE
litigation, because of the asymmetry intrinsic to such litigation: given
that the PAE does not make or sell products, the PAE itself cannot be
subjected to a patent litigation suit. As a result, the PAE business model,
assuming it is implemented properly, cannot fail-a PAE, by locating
and acquiring a set of patents that has a nexus to the targeted product,
should always succeed in patent litigation against the targeted product
or product line. This may explain the proliferation of PAE litigation in
recent years. The policy question this raises is whether such a patent
system may be sustainably maintained.
A. Basic ObservationsRelating to CurrentPatentLitigation
One fundamental observation regarding patent litigation is that, by
the time of trial, the dispute in litigation of a single patent is usually
reduced to a small number of independent and material (that is,
potentially outcome-determinative) issues-usually less than 20, and
typically between 5-10-that must be resolved by the court during trial.
Excepting actions for declaratory judgment in which an alleged
infringer files the patent suit, the portfolio patentee usually has control
over the number of these material issues and the probability of the
patentee's succeeding on each of these material issues. This is because
the patentee may engage in preparation and analysis before filing suit,
and may select the set of patents that presents the highest probabilities
for findings of infringement. In particular, the portfolio patentee may
analyze a set of patents in the portfolio that have a nexus to the targeted,
potentially infringing products, and pick one or more patents from that
set that present the fewest number of material issues and the 110
highest
corresponding probabilities for prevailing on the material issues.
Another basic observation is that patentees, especially PAEs, are
110. The patentee's ability to control the probabilities of winning the material issues that
need to be resolved in the patent litigation is not critical to the analysis. In fact, as a matter of
mathematical analysis, even a set of low probabilities for the patentee to prevail on the material
issues in the litigation does not make a difference, as long as the patentee is able to find and
assert a sufficiently large number of patents having a nexus to the targeted product or product
line. See Tables I & 2, infra Part IV.
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able to find and acquire the rights to more than one, and often, many
patents that have a nexus to a targeted product or line of products. In
particular, PAEs are often able to identify and assert a number of
patents from different technology areas against the same product or
product line."' This is especially true where the products involved are
consumer goods in the hi-tech areas, such as cellular phones,
televisions, printers, computers and laptops, which are complex
products with multiple layers of components and functionalities that
number of patented technologies from different
may incorporate a1 1large
2
technology areas.

When the patentee selects patents in different technology areas for
assertion, it is likely that the material issues that arise in connection with
a particular patent are independent from the material issues that arise in
connection with the other patents. This is because the likelihood of
correlation of material issues across patents should be low when the
patents are not related to one another and relate to different technology
areas.
Furthermore, by the time of trial, the material issues in dispute in
connection with a specific patent can usually be reduced to a core set of
independent material issues. For example, any claim construction
disputes remaining by the time of trial will usually be independent from
one another, because such disputes usually relate to distinct terms in the
asserted claims of the patent. Similarly invalidity issues relating to
different elements of a claim are also usually independent. It is
frequently the case, however, that a material infringement or invalidity
issue is based on a particular claim construction that is in dispute. In this
case, the dispute regarding claim construction is not independent of the
disputes regarding infringement or invalidity regarding the invalidity
111. For example, in the International Trade Commission investigation Certain Consumer
Electronics and DisplayDevices and Products ContainingSame, the plaintiff PAE had asserted
U.S. patent no. 6,650,327 directed to floating point rasterization in display image processing,
U.S. patent no. 6,816,145 directed to LCD panel technology, and U.S. patent no. 5,717,881
directed to instruction processing within a CPU, against, among other things, various tablet
devices. Certain Consumer Electronics Complaint, supra note 10. In the International Trade
Commission investigation Certain Electronic Devices, Including Handheld, Wireless
Communications Devices, the plaintiff PAE had asserted U.S. patent no. 5,235,635 directed to
awakening a device from a low power state suing a keypad monitor with keypad activity-based
activation, U.S. patent no. 5,530,597 directed to a technique for awakening a processor within
an electronic device from an idle state and servicing high priority tasks using interrupts and
masking techniques, and U.S. patent no. 5,608,873 directed to interprocessor communication
against, among other things, certain wireless phones. Certain Electronic Devices, Including
Handheld, Wireless Communications Devices, Inv. Nos. 337-TA-667 and 337-TA-673,
availableat http://www.itcblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/saxoncomplaint.pdf.
112. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 41, at 19-20; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent
Holdings andRoyalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1991, 2025-29 (2007).
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argument. 113 However, this would not change the analysis below
materially: the material issue regarding claim construction and the
related material issue regarding infringement (or invalidity) would
count as a single independent material issue instead of counting as two
material issues. For that reason, the material issues in dispute in
connection with an assertion of a specific patent can usually be reduced
to a core set of independent material issues.
B. Simple Illustrative Case-Two MaterialIssues Per PatentAsserted
As a way of illustrating the basic idea, consider that the patentee is
able to identify a plurality of patents that has a nexus to a particular
product or line of products. Assume further that whether or not the
product or product line infringes a particular asserted patent depends on
the resolution of just two material issues.1 14 These issues may comprise
any of the typical material issues that are considered by courts during
patent infringement trials, such as issues relating to claim construction,
infringement, invalidity, and inequitable conduct. Assume that the
probability of the patentee's prevailing on any of these issues,
regardless of which patent is asserted, is given by po,, wherie 0<p, <1. It
may be helpful, to illustrate the versatility of the analysis, to think of p"
as being either a low probability such as 0.2 (that is, 20%), or a high
probability such as 0.8 (that is, 80%). Consider the overall probability
of the patentee's prevailing in obtaining a patent infringement judgment
for at least one of the asserted patents, as the number of asserted patents
is varied.
1. One Patent Asserted
When a single patent is asserted, the probability that the patentee
loses in its infringement assertion is just the probability that the patentee
loses on at least one of the two material issues (which is the same as one
minus the probability that the patentee prevails on both material
issues)'15:
113. See Roger A. Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REv.
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2256207.

114. It is simplest, but not necessary, to consider that only a single claim is asserted per
patent and that the material issues arising in connection with a patent all relate to the single
asserted claim. The assertion of more than one claim per patent would lead to a greater
likelihood of the patentee's success in proving patent infringement liability based on one claim
of one patent. For that reason, there would be an even quicker convergence to 100% probability
of the patentee's success in establishing liability of the accused infringer for at least one patent
compared to the simple case in which a single claim is asserted per patent.
115. To establish infringement of a particular claim, the patentee needs to prevail on all the
disputed material infringement issues relating to that claim. To establish that the claim is not
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Pose =

(1 - P. 2 )

So, the patentee's probability of winning a patent infringement

judgment for the asserted patent is just one minus the above probability:
2
Pwi,, = 1 -(1 - P"w
)

When the probability of patentee's winning each material issue is
80% (that is, p, = 0.8), the patentee's probability of winning is 0.8 x 0.8
= 0.64, or 64%.

When the probability of patentee's winning each material issue is
20% (that is, p,, = 0.2), the patentee's probability of winning is 0.2 x 0.2
= 0.04, or 4%.
2. Two Patents Asserted
In this case two patents are asserted with each posing two material

issues. The patentee's probability of losing its infringement case for
both patents is:
Piose (1 -po 2 ) (1 _po)
So, the patentee's probability of winning a patent infringement

judgment for at least one of the patents is just one minus the above
probability:
Pwin = 1 -(1

- p 2) (1 -P2)

When the probability of patentee's prevailing on each material issue
is 80% (that is, p, = 0.8), the patentee's probability of winning on at

least one patent is then 0.87, or 87%.
When the probability of patentee's prevailing on each material issue
is 20% (that is, po = 0.2), the patentee's probability of winning is then

0.078, or 7.8%.

invalid with respect to a particular reference, the patentee needs to prevail on only one of the
disputed material invalidity issues. If there is more than one invalidity issue relating to a single
asserted claim of a patent, then requiring that the patentee must win on all of the invalidity
issues to prevail will lead to an underestimate of the patentee's chances of success. For that
reason, the convergence to 100% probability that the patentee will succeed in establishing
liability with respect to at least one patent will in actuality occur even more quickly than in the
treatment that follows. For that reason, in the treatment that follows, it is permissible to consider
all material invalidity issues that arise in connection with a single asserted claim as constituting
a single, independent material issue that arises in connection with the claim.
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3. Three Patents Asserted
In this case three patents are asserted, with each posing two material
issues. The patentee's probability of losing its infringement case for all
three patents is:
Pose= 0(1 -p. 2) (1

.)2 (I -p.2)

So, the patentee's probability of winning a patent infringement
judgment for at least one of the patents is just one minus the above
probability:

Pw,,, = I - (I -po,2) (1

_-p., 2) (-p.o

)

When the probability of patentee's winning each material issue is
80% (that is, p,, = 0.8), the patentee's probability of winning on at least
one patent is then 0.95, or 95%.
When the probability of patentee's winning each material issue is
20% (that is, p,, = 0.2), the patentee's probability of winning is then
0.115, or 11.5%.
4. N Patents Asserted
In this case N patents are asserted (where N is some positive integer
number), with each posing two material issues. The Ipatentee's
probability of losing its infringement case for all N patents is'
Plo.. =0 (-. pc 2 )
Prose =

( 1- _p2) ...
(I _-p. 2)

f(1-p.o
i=1

2)

So, the patentee's probability of winning a patent infringement judgment
for at least one of the patents is just one minus the above probability:
Pwin = 1-

i=1

(1 -p) 2)
(i

Table 1 illustrates the probability of the patentee's winning on at
least one patent when the probability of winning each material issue is
80% and 20%, respectively.
116. This is (1 - p2) multiplied by itself N times.
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Table 1 - Probability of Patentee's Winning on at Least one Patent
When the Probability of Winning on Each of Two Issues is
20% or 80%

Number of
Patents Asserted
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Probability of
Patentee's Winning
on at Least One
Patent when p. = 0.2
4%
7.8%
11.5%
15.1%
18.5%
21.7%
24.9%
27.9%
30.7%
33.5%

Probability of
Patentee's Winning
on at Least One
0.8
Patent when p.
64%
87%
95.3%
98.3%
99.3%
99.8%
99.9%
100%
100%
100%

20

55.8%

100%

30

70.6%

100%

40

80.5%

100%

50

87.0%

100%

As can be seen, in the model, when the probability of winning on
each issue is pw, = 80%, the patentee's probability of winning on at least
one patent approaches 100% very quickly; in particular, when eight
such patents are asserted, the patentee's probability of winning on at
least one patent is approximately 100%.
When the probability of winning on each issue is p,, = 20%, the
patentee's probability of winning on at least one patent approaches
100% slowly; but when 10 such patents are asserted, the probability of
the patentee's winning on at least one patent is approximately 33.5%,
which is, after all, a large probability of winning considering the weak
group of patents asserted.' It is obviously in the interest of the patentee
to select for assertion the set of patents that provides the highest
probabilities of winning on each of the relevant material issues.
117. Obviously, the expense and capability to sue on a large number of patents decrease as
N increases. In particular, given the expense and complexity of U.S. patent litigation, it probably
is not practically feasible to sue a defendant on more than about ten patents at a time.
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Table 2 - Probability of Patentee's Winning on at Least one Patent
When the Probability of Winning on Each of Five Issues is
20% or 80%

Number of Patents
Asserted
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Probability of
Patentee's Winning
on at Least One
patent when p,, = 0.2
0.032%
0.064%
0.096%
0.13%
0.16%
0.19%
0.22%
0.26%
0.29%
0.32%

Probability of
Patentee's Winning
on at Least One
Patent when p. = 0.8
32.8%
54.8%
69.6%
79.6%
86.3%
90.8%
93.8%
95.8%
97.2%
98.1%

20

0.64%

100%

30

0.96%

100%

40

1.3%

100%

50

1.6%

100%

100

3.1%

100%

200

6.2%

100%

500

14.8%

100%

1000

27.4%

100%

C. Dependence on the Number of MaterialIssues in Dispute
As would be expected, an increase in the number of material issues
in dispute leads to slower convergence of the probability of winning to
100% as the number of asserted patents becomes large. This can be seen
by comparing Table 1 with Table 2, which treats the case of five
material issues per patent, with the probability of winning on each
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material issue being 20% or 80%.One can see that a greater number of
issues in dispute per patent leads to slower convergence of the
probability of the patentee's winning on at least one patent. The
convergence, however, in all cases is still to a 100% probability. It is
obviously in the accused infringer's interest to generate as many
material issues in dispute as possible given the particular patents the
PAE asserts in the litigation.
The convergence to 100% probability of the patentee's winning is
extremely slow, when there are a large number of issues in dispute and
the patentee's probability of winning each material issue is low. For
example, as depicted in Table 2, in the case in which the patentee only
has a 20% probability of winning on each of five material issues per
patent, the patentee's probability of winning is only 1.6% when,
unrealistically, 50 patents are asserted. Clearly, it is in the PAE's
interest to take the time and care to diligently select the particular set of
patents for assertion that maximizes the probabilities of the patentee's
winning on all the material issues in dispute for that set of patents.
D. Most General Case
The above discussion treated a simple case in which a basic
assumption is that there are exactly two or five issues in dispute per
litigated patent. This is enough to illustrate the basic idea. However,
these assumptions are not critical and only simplify the analysis.
Appendix A of this Article treats the general case in which there are a
potentially different number of material issues in dispute for each
litigated patent, and there is a potentially different, independent
probability of winning on each material issue. Under reasonable
assumptions, it is easy to show that the probability of the patentee's
winning on at least one patent approaches 100% in the limit that the
number of patents becomes large. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the
analysis to the probabilities on prevailing on the material issues
approaches zero as the number of patents becomes large. For that
reason, the exact probabilities on winning on each issue are not critical,
as long as a sufficiently great number of patents are asserted.
V. THE NEAR CERTAINTY OF PAE VICTORY IN PORTFOLIO
PATENT LITIGATION

The fundamental observation of this Article is that as the number of
patents asserted against a product or line of products increases, the
probability of the patentee's winning on at least one patent increases. In
the limit of a large number of patents, this probability of winning
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approaches 100%. Consequently, the patentee may ensure that it will
win a patent infringement judgment in connection with a specific
product or product line of an infringer by asserting a sufficiently large
number of patents. Given that convergence to 100% probability of
winning is slow when the patentee's probability of prevailing on
material issues in dispute is low, the patentee should conduct due
diligence to determine the group of patents that presents it with the
highest probabilities of winning on the material issues in dispute.
The assumption of independence of probabilities of winning on
material issues that underlies this result is likely most justified when the
patentee asserts patents from unrelated technological areas against the
same product or product line. This will most often be easiest to do when
the product or product line involved is complex-for example, a hi-tech
consumer good-such as a cellular phone, television, printer, computer
or laptop. Such products include numerous electronic components, such
as processors and storage components, software layers, displays,
input/output devices, storage and memory components, each of which
may be subject to multiple patents in different technology areas."
A set of property rights that always or almost always results in
liability for the accused infringer appears to be problematic. However,
this result is tempered in most contexts by other considerations. First,
there are many classes of products that do not have the multilayered
complexity of hi-tech consumer goods. Because of this, the patent
system does not tend to generate a large number of patents that cover
such products. For example, pharmaceutical and mechanical products
are not usually covered by a large number of patents. For that reason,
the patentee in these contexts does not possess a strategy that is almost
certain to lead it to prevail (or force a favorable settlement).
Second, in many contexts, the asymmetry in the probability of
prevailing in a patent dispute that is discussed in this Article is
alleviated by other considerations. One example is a dispute that
involves the assertion of a portfolio of patents by the defendant in
addition to the plaintiff, such as is the case when competitors sue each
other for patent infringement. The fact that each party will likely prevail
in its own assertion of its portfolio of patents will likely lead to a
settlement, which is usually considered to be a useful social result.
There is one context where the asymmetry in the probability of
118. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. See also Jeffrey I.D. Lewis, The Sky is not

Falling: Navigating the Smartphone Patent Thicket, WIPO MAG. (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipo-magazine/en/2013/0 1/article_0002.html
(discussing the patent
thicket in the smartphone product area); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, 119,

119-22 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds. 2001) (discussing patent thickets and their consequences in
various industries).
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prevailing in a patent dispute is not alleviated by other considerations:
portfolio patent litigation by a patent assertion entity (PAL) against an
accused infringer that is a manufacturer and/or distributor of complex,
multi-layered products. In this context, the PAE can assure itself of
victory by asserting a plurality of patents against the accused infringer.
The accused infringer, however, does not have any similar leverage
against the PAE, because the PAE does not manufacture or distribute
any products that are potentially vulnerable to a patent infringement
suit.
90%t
70%
60%

-

-

50%

a non-PAE

40%

M PAE

30%
20%
10%
0%

__ _.
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Fig. 1-Patent litigations filed by PAEs and non-PAEs by year (data
from RPX Corp.) 19
The prescription for the PAE is clear: assert a plurality of patents in
different technology areas that all have a nexus to and potentially cover
a commercially successful product or product line. This strategy should
lead the PAE to either prevail in the litigation or force a favorable
settlement. PAEs appear to frequently employ this strategy. 120 The
tremendous increase in PAE lawsuits over the last few years may be a
reality that PAE victory is almost assured in portfolio
reflection of the 121
patent litigation.
119. See COLEEN V. CHIEN, PATENT TROLLS BY THE NUMBERS, SANTA CLARA UNIv. LEGAL
=
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER No. 08-13, at 1 (2013), available at http://ssm.com/abstract
2233041.
120. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
121. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 5. The convergence to
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VI. CONCLUSIONS

The primary conclusion of this Article is that PAE victory in
portfolio patent litigation is virtually certain, as long as the PAE asserts
a sufficient number of patents. This means that it will be in PAEs'
interest to engage in portfolio patent litigation, as long as the potential
damages exceed the costs of litigation. Given the prediction that the
portfolio patentee will almost always prevail, this Article predicts that

measures focused on penalizing a PAE that does not prevail, such as
shifting the costs of litigation onto a losing portfolio patent-asserting
PAE, will likely not succeed. Such measures may deter certain PA~s

due to the perception of potential added risk that they entail; however, a
determined PAE asserting sufficiently many patents should nevertheless

prevail.
Furthermore, the theory discussed in this Article is consistent with

many of the predictive insights of the Parchomovsky article. For
example, as the Parchomovsky article predicted, patenting intensity has
remained high during the years following the publication of that article
in 2005. This Article predicts that this will continue to be the case going
forward. Patenting intensity has been and is expected to continue to be

especially high in technology areas where PAEs are most active, such as
in the hi-tech and software technology areas. 122 Essentially, one would
expect patentees to continue to apply for and obtain patents in
technology areas where the patentee is virtually assured of victory in
portfolio patent litigation.
Additionally, as again predicted by the Parchomovsky paper in 2005,
pressure on the PTO regarding the quality and quantity of patents that

are granted will continue to increase. This prediction of the
Parchomovsky paper appears to have been fulfilled over the past eight
years. 123 The theory discussed in this Article, however, implies that only
100% probability of the patentee's establishing liability is slow when the patentee's probability
of winning on the material issues presented by the asserted patents is low. However, it is likely,
due to an increasing profusion of patent rights in relevant areas such as software and the hi-tech
fields, that patentees are easily able to identify and assert patents that present material issues
regarding which they have high probabilities of success.
Not all non-practicing entities are PAEs. In particular, universities and small inventors do not
usually assert multiple patents against a product or a line of products like PAEs. However, only
5% or so of the cases filed by non-practicing entities during 1995-2012 were filed by
universities. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 28, at 27.
122. See JAMES BESSEN, A GENERATION OF SOFTWARE PATENTS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW WORKING PAPER No. 11-3 1, at 26 (2011), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/
faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/BessenJ062 111 withBeckman.pdf (indicating that
approximately 2000 software patents were granted in the United States in 1980, approximately
25,000 were granted in 2005, and approximately 37,000 were granted in 2009).
123. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 106, at 39-45 (discussing
measures that the PTO has taken or is undertaking to improve patent quality).
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drastic reform in the area of the quality and quantity of patents granted
by the PTO can potentially make a difference. For example, virtual
certainty of victory of the portfolio patent holder in patent litigation can
only be prevented if no more than a few patents are assertable against
complex products, especially in the hi-tech and software areas. No
patent reform effort discussed to this point, short of a previously
discussed, radical and problematic outright ban on patents in these areas
would likely make a material difference in this regard.1 24 In particular,
changes in the obviousness threshold for patentability are unlikely to
make much of a difference, unless such changes result in only a few
granted patents being assertable against complex products in the hi-tech
and software areas.
Measures that prevent PAEs from asserting patents, or prevent them
from asserting more than one or a few patents against a single product
or product line, could potentially alleviate the problem discussed in this
Article. However, it may be difficult to provide for a clear set of rules
that has the desired effect. For example, a PAE may assert a portfolio of
patents against a product or product line in separate litigations such that
only a single patent is asserted in each of the litigations. Furthermore, a
PAE may collude with non-PAEs in asserting a portfolio of patents
against a product or product line. In particular, a PAE could assign
patents it believes have a nexus to a particular product or product line to
a non-PAE entity in return for promises by the latter to assert the patents
and share any damages revenues that the latter obtains.
Remedies-oriented measures may also disincentivize PAEs from
asserting patents, including portfolios of patents. For example, a lower
measure of damages, and/or rendering it more difficult for PAEs to
obtain injunctions, may change the cost/benefit calculus for PAEs in a
way that discourages the filing of patent suits, including those involving
a portfolio of patents. This Article predicts, however, that as long as the
potential damages that could be collected continues to materially exceed
the total costs of portfolio patent litigation, PAEs will continue to assert
portfolios of patents against particular products or product lines.
Finally, a corollary of the result that a PAE is assured of victory by
124. Certain authors argue that the threshold for patentability of software patents should be
set higher, without arguing for a complete ban of software patents. See, e.g., BEN KLEMENS, THE
RISE OF THE INFORMATION PROCESSING PATENT 38, (June 21, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-959931 (arguing that a device should be patentable "only if it is based on steps that are
simultaneously novel and non-trivially physical"). An outright ban could have an adverse
impact on innovation, because, for example, it could make it more difficult for startup
companies engaged in software innovation or using software to obtain financing.
1725. The U.S. Supreme Court raised the obviousness threshold for patentability materially
in 2007. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). However, while approximately
30,000 software patents were granted in 2006, approximately 37,000 were granted in 2009.
BESSEN, supra note 123, at 26.
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asserting a sufficient number of patents is that the value of a specific
patent likely has strong dependence on how it is asserted. For example,
a patent that does not have great value based on an analysis using
conventional valuation techniques may actually help establish liability
and large patent damages when it is asserted by a PAE together with
other patents. For that reason, known methodologies for valuing patents,
to the extent they do not consider how the value proposition may be
impacted by assertion of the patent together with other patents, may be
deficient.
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Appendix A
Mathematical Treatment of the General Case
The patentee asserts N patents, where N is some positive integer
number. The determination of whether the ith patent is infringed requires
the resolution of ni material legal issues in dispute, where each ni is a
positive integer number. These issues may comprise any of the typical
material issues that are considered by courts during patent infringement
trials, such as claim construction, infringement, invalidity, inequitable
conduct and so on.' 26 The probability of the patentee's winning on the
jth legal issue for the ith patent is denoted by p5.

The N patents are from different technology areas, so that the
probabilities for prevailing on the material legal issues of different
patents are most likely mathematically independent of one another.
Further, the material legal issues associated with a single patent from
among the N patents are also assumed to be mathematically
independent.
The probability of the patentee losing on all material issues (and thus on
all patents) is then:

Plose=i=1
11

j=1

Assume that 0 < pj < 1. This means that there is some uncertainty in
winning or losing on each of the material legal issues. Then, for all i,
0<

1

p

<1

126. As discussed in the main body of this paper, a patent infringement dispute may reduce
to a core set of independent material issues before trial. See supra text accompanying note 113.
In connection with a particular claim, the patentee must generally win on all of the material
infringement-related issues to establish liability. However, if there is more than one invalidity
issue relating to a single asserted claim of a patent, then requiring that the patentee must win on
all of the invalidity issues to prevail will lead to an underestimate of the patentee's chances of
success. For that reason, the convergence to 100% probability that the patentee will succeed in
establishing liability with respect to at least one patent will in actuality occur even more quickly
than in the treatment that follows. For that reason, in the treatment that follows, it is permissible
to consider all material invalidity issues that arise in connection with a single asserted claim as
constituting a single, independent material issue that arises in connection with the claim. See
supra note 115.
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In particular, in realistic scenarios, there will be some particular value
Pmax such that for each i:
0<1-J~ i)!<
a<1

Then,
lim

L=1

N .-40
oooN-0

-

j=

j

/

1

iMl

Pmax = lim PmaxN

I=

But, limNo, PmaxN = 0.127 So,
lim Pose
N-4co

= N-+o
li N F

1

i

pi) = 0

j=J
i=1
Thus, the probability of the patentee's losing on all N patents
approaches zero. This is the just a different way of stating that the
probability of the patentee's winning on at least one patent is 100% in
the limit that the number of patents asserted approaches infinity.
Sensitivity of the Conclusion to Errors in Assessing the Probability of
the Patentee's Winning on a Material Issue
This section of the paper considers the sensitivity of the conclusion that
a PAE is assured of victory to any errors in assessing the probabilities of
the patentee's winning on the material issues that arise in connection
with the assertion of each patent. As discussed below, for a large
number of patents that are asserted, the sensitivity to the exact values of
these probabilities approaches zero. Thus, the greater the number of
patents that are asserted, the lesser28 the importance of determining the
exact values of these probabilities.'
A.

The Case of Two Material Issues Per Patent and Equal

Probabilities
As discussed in the main body of this paper in Part IV, when there are
two material issues per patent and the probability of the patentee's
127. In particular, for any e > 0, choose any integer m > In

Then, Pmaxm < e. Thus,

Pmaxm can be made arbitrarily close to 0 by choosing m sufficiently large.

128. Given that the functions Pose considered in this paper are well-behaved, and that, as
discussed earlier, lim Pose = 0 it is not surprising that the sensitivity of Pose to changes in the
N-eo
value of p,, goes to
zero as N -- oo. The following provides a specific treatment.
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prevailing on each issue is given by po, the patentee's probability of
losing on all asserted patents is given by:
N

Probability of patentee's losing = Plose =

J7J(1 - po, )
2

Then, to first order, the sensitivity of P.ose to the value of p" is given
by:
aPlose

-2Np,,

(1 - p.,2)

(9p.,
In the limit as N

1-

1

oo both the numerator and the denominator go to

-

infinity. For that reason, one may apply L'H6pital's Rule, which
involves considering the limit when N -- co of the fraction formed by
the derivative with respect to N of the numerator and the derivative with
respect to N of the denominator:
lim

N-400

ose

apo,

2

p
In( 1 - p,2)(1 - p.

lim

N--o

0

2 1- N

)

Thus, there is no sensitivity to first order of the patentee's probability of
losing (and thus also of the patentee's probability of winning on at least
one patent) to errors in the exact value of the probability Po, in the limit
of a large number of asserted patents.
Higher Order Derivatives
It can be shown that the higher-order derivatives of Pose with respect to
po, also approach zero as N approaches infinity. For example, it can be
shown that:
a 2Pose

-

-2N

+

4(N)(N-

1)p,

2

2- N
1(1 - p.2)
(1 - po 2 ) N
ap~o2
8(N)(N - 1)(N - 2)p,
a 3 Ptose 12po(N)(N - 1)

ap,

3

04Prose

op.

4

(1 - p.

2

)

2-

N

12(N)(N - 1)
(1 - pWo2)2

-

N

(1 - NJ2)

3- N

48(N)(N - 1)(N(1 - p2)

16(N)(N - 1)(N - 2)(N(1 - pO2)4

3

2)p,

2

3- N

3)p

4

- N

Based on the above, it is apparent that the highest order term of the nth
order derivative will be of order (1 - po 2 )N • N'. Repeated application
of L'H6pital's Rule indicates that this term will go to zero as N
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approaches infinity. For that reason, higher order derivatives also
approach zero as N approaches infinity.
B.

The Case of M Material Issues Per Patent and Equal Probabilities

The analysis in this case is substantially similar to that of the case of
two material issues per patent. The patentee's probability of losing on
all asserted patents is given by:
N

Probability of patentee's losing = Plose =

J7(

1

- PWM)

Then, to first order, the sensitivity of the patentee's probability of losing
on all N patents to the value p, is given by:
aPlose

-NMpaM-1

ap.o

(1 - P.M)"-

In the limit as N -- co both the numerator and the denominator go to
infinity. For that reason, once again apply L'H6pital's
Rule:
dPloseMPo
lim
= lim

N-oo

ap.

MpM-

1 - p.M)(1 - p.M)1-

N-,oo In(

0

n

Thus, in this case as well, there is no first order sensitivity of the
patentee's probability of losing (and thus also of the patentee's
probability of winning on at least one patent) to errors in the exact value
of the probability p,, in the limit of a large number of asserted patents.
Higher Order Derivatives
It can be shown that the higher-order derivatives of Plose with respect to
Pow also approach zero as N approaches infinity. For example, it can be
shown that:
2M - 2
2
o 2 Plose -N(M)(M - 1)poM 2 M (N)(N - 1)po
apW2
a 3 Plose

apw3

(1 - pM)

-

N

(1 - p~oM)2

-N(M)(M - 1)(M - 2)p,)
(1 - po M)1 - N
3(N)(N - 1)(M 2 )(M

-

1)p

2 M- 3

(1 - pwM)2 - N
3M 3
(N)(N - 1)(N - 2)M p o

(1 - poM)3 -

- N

M- 3

N

3
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th
Based on the above, it is apparent that the highest order term of the n
order derivative will be of order (1 - p,,M)N • N' . Repeated application
of L'H6pital's Rule indicates that this term will go to zero as N
approaches infinity. For that reason, higher order derivatives also
approach zero as N approaches infinity.

C.

The Case of an Arbitrary Number of Material Issues Per Patent
and Equal Probabilities of Prevailing on the Material Issues in
Dispute

In this case, the ith patent presents ai material issues that are disputed by
the patentee and the accused infringer. The probability of the patentee's
prevailing on each material issue is given by Pw. Then,
N

P1ose = ]J(j - p,,a ,)
i=1

Note that for each patent, there will be a finite number of issues in
dispute. For that reason, one can rewrite the terms of the expression
above so that the factors representing one issue per patent appear first,
followed by factors representing two issues per patent, three issues per
patent and so on:
3
Plose = (1 - pj)b (1 - p, 2)b 2 (1_ po )b3 ... (1- pwmax)bmax
This expression describes the fact that there are b, patents that have
only a single material issue in dispute, b2 patents that have two material
issues in dispute and so on. Accordingly, there are bmax patents that
have max number of material issues in dispute, which is the maximum
number of material issues in dispute that any one patent from the set of
N patents may have. Clearly,
max

N

i=1

j=1

Then, to first order, the sensitivity of the patentee's probability of losing
on all N patents to the value of the probability of winning on a material
issue is given by:
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2pob22
2b 3 Plose
ba
1 se
l 3p,-seP
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1 -~ P 2lose
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-

Simplifying,
O Plose

op,

i=1

Because 0 < pji < 1,
OPlose
=
op. I

max

max

axi pi'-1 • b-. <"Pose -

e

i=1

i=1

i"
•I1
bi
1 P 1

max

Plose

P/w-1bi
.b
1 I~1i=1 .
-1

It is easy to show that the function f(i) = i • pw- reaches a maximum
value at the nearest integer value of i that is greater than Calling
In p,

this nearest integer value i0,
max
Oflose < Pose

io-1 max
bi
01

p-1

O=1

Pose ' o P
-

1Pc

i=1

But,
max

Sbi=N
i=1

So, for some finite constant value C,
Oflose < C" Pose "N

opo

-

But,
N

Plose = FJ(i - ptai)
i=1

N

J7J(i --pbmax) -(1i=1

pobmax)N
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N

imIpl
aPiose
3

N-_+0

I e Pw

C

[(1(Pose "N) 5 C -nlim
r-lim

pwbmax)N

.

N]

-ooN

It is easy to see based on the above, by repeatedly applying L'H6pital's
Rule, that
lim OPiose

N-oo-w

-0

Therefore, in this case as well, there is no sensitivity to first order of the
patentee's probability of losing (and thus also of the patentee's
probability of winning on at least one patent) to errors in the exact value
of the probability P,, in the limit of a large number of asserted patents.
Higher-Order Derivatives
It can be shown that the higher-order derivatives of Prose with respect to
p,, also approach zero as N approaches infinity. For example,
0 2Plose

_

O~t°2

flose max
i=1

pL" bi

1 - po.,

max i2 ".

1_ 2 "i_"pi-2

PloseZ'1

-w

. i+ i"p2i-2,b
i

The first term on the right hand side is of order "lose" N 2 . By once
again applying L'H6pital's Rule repeatedly, one can show that the limit
as N approaches infinity of the first term on the right hand side is zero.
Additionally, the limit as N approaches infinity of the second term on
the right hand side is also zero. Given that max, the maximum number
of issues in dispute that any one patent from the set of patents may have,
is finite, the second term on the right hand side is of order Plose "N. As
discussed earlier, the limit as N approaches infinity of Pose "N is zero
(based on an application of L'H6pital's Rule). For that reason, the limit
as N approaches infinity of the second term on the right hand side is
also zero.
Thus,

0--m
j2os

NI.)p
1,6 2 I0
2
above,
Additionally, it is apparent, based on the expression for °2-apoj
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that the highest order term of the nth order derivative will be of order
phose "N'. Repeated application of L'H6pital's Rule indicates that this
term will go to zero as N approaches infinity. For that reason, higher
order derivatives also approach zero as N approaches infinity.
D.

The Case of an Arbitrary Number of Material Issues Per Patent
With Respective Probabilities of Prevailing on the Material Issues
in Dispute

As was discussed earlier in this Appendix, in the most general case, the
determination of whether the i t h patent is infringed requires the
resolution of ni material legal issues in dispute, where each ni is a
positive integer number. The probability of the patentee's winning on
the jth legal issue for the ith patent is denoted by pj.
The probability of the patentee losing on all issues (and thus on all
patents) is then:
P1ose

l

=

1

i=1

j=l

Then, to first order, the sensitivity of the patentee's probability of losing
on all N patents to the value of the probability of winning on a
particular material issue is given by:
a PtoseH1j 0 piO
-

1

- -osep

Clearly, for some constant K,
lim [Piose
I = K. lim Plose
N..oo
[ p o-o
N4P 0
N-+*c

But, as discussed earlier at the beginning of this Appendix (in
connection with the mathematical treatment of the general case), for this
case,
lim Prose = 0
N---00
Therefore,
lim O

Ioe = o
Jio
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Thus, in this case as well, there is no first-order sensitivity of the
patentee's probability of losing (and thus also of the patentee's
probability of winning on at least one patent) to any error in the exact
value of the probability p5, in the limit of a large number of asserted
patents.
Higher-Order Derivatives
It can be shown that the higher-order derivatives of Prose with respect to
the probability pj also approach zero as N approaches infinity. First,
because the expression for Prose is linear with respect to any particular
p5, any second or higher order derivative with respect to a particular
pjis zero. Second, it is easy to see that any mixed partial derivative iof
Prose that includes first order derivatives with respect to different pj s
will be at most of order Plose. For that reason,
i higher-order derivatives
of Prose with respect to the probabilities pj also approach zero as N
approaches infinity.
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